The aim of this document will therefore be to unpack as much as possible the terms of the agreement between Great Britain and the United States, not only to understand the fundamental mechanisms underlying it, but also to examine what international law is and certain human rights issues, particularly from the point of view of European law. This, in turn, could help to assess the possible between the agreement between the United Kingdom and the United States and the draft agreement between the EU and the United States on this subject, on which negotiations have recently begun. Before rushing into what this means for transatlantic access to prosecution and, in particular, how a future agreement between the EU and the US could differ, it is important to understand its provisions, safeguards and the functioning of the mechanisms of direct access to data put in place by the agreement. But «understanding» cross-border data is not always easy, and the agreement between Britain and the United States is far from an exception. The agreement contains a number of complex mechanisms that were deemed necessary to take into account the different legal requirements of the parties. The introduction of terms such as «receiver-party-person» (based on the idea of reciprocity, but with two differentiated regimes) or «American people» and the resulting targeting procedures, provided for in the agreement, seem strange to lawyers who are not familiar with the subject, let alone the general public, in a way. In addition, the implementation of a «direct access to data» system must generally take into account a large number of factors: the location of the data is one of them; The location of the people targeted is different. and the location of cloud/communication service providers («CSPs») is a third. The combination of these factors and the fact that several «sites» (and different jurisdictions) may be involved in a request for access to digital evidence sometimes makes it difficult to determine how (or if) different cross-border requirements are dealt with under the agreement. Communication to third countries does not alleviate the problem, but aggravates it by bringing the third country to electronic surveillance of a person within its borders. The agreement makes them worse because it does not specify whether a notification should be made, for example. B before the interception order is issued or executed.
If this is reported prior to forfeiture, it is likely that the country could oppose the implementation of electronic surveillance within its borders.